The article considers the peculiarities of the process of G-20 institutionalization. The G-20 is an informal institution, and because of that we substantiate the assumption that the G-20 compensates its informality through interaction with formal IFIs (international financial institutions), choosing the way of interaction within the models that they consider to be the most effective. The study concluded that these models of interaction between the G-20 and the IFIs determine its place and role in the architecture of global governance. From the standpoint of institutional theory, we suggest a rational approach to effective global governance by combining four models of interaction between the G-20 and the IFI. The work focuses on the key issues of the development of modern monetary and financial relations in the aspect of the Russian economy and the interests of Russian entrepreneurship. Among the tasks facing the leaders of business (entrepreneurship) and government, we mark those that with a high probability pass from one summit agenda to another summit agenda of the G-20 (future). The Russian Federation has been part of the G-20 since its inception (the meetings started in 1999; in 2008 started the summits with the leaders of the countries). Based on the results of the study of the materials of Russia's participation in the G-20 summits, we reveal that the relationship between Russia and the G-20 is largely asymmetric, since most of Russia's strategic proposals (in the context of reforming the world financial system (MFS) and others) were not taken into account in the decisions of the G -20. As a result, the Russian Federation as a whole, and in particular its financial system is burdened with obligations to the G-20 (tax, pension reform, restrictions on the regulation of the foreign exchange market, compliance with the requirements of Basel III, etc.), which contradict the state's national interests. As a result, we draw a conclusion about the need to change the format of Russia's participation in the G-20 from the position of lobbying and promotion of state (Russian) interests.
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