Maslov D.G.Published in:
Food Policy and Security
– Volume 3, Number 3 (July-September)

JEL classification: K11, Q15, R52

Keywords: characteristic specification of ownership of a natural object, collective ownership, land, natural good, pattern of land ownership, private property, shared ownership, state ownership


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Abstract:

In recent years, the issue of the need to suspend the reduction of agricultural production has arisen at all levels of discussion of the problems of agricultural development. We may state that in the late 1990s, in the agrarian sphere there was a transition to a narrowed type of reproduction, including the economic soil fertility, since conducted transitions of land relations within the transition to private land ownership and to other means of production did not lead to improvement of land use. Implementation of intensive searches for efficient land owners through various organizational and legal forms still continues today. Disputes around the land are largely generated by the lack of understanding of the very nature of property and by contrasting private with common joint forms of ownership. The coordination of interests of individual members of the group and the collective as a whole is the main problem which faces the community property in all its variants. The confusion of the notions of "public ownership", "state ownership", "collective ownership" in the end generates inefficiency of the institutional environment of EES and creates the motivation to use the simplest way of installation of ownership institution on elements of the ecological subsystem through their complete privatization. But due to special characteristics of environmental goods used by individuals as benefits of joint application, the individual appropriation of components of natural ecosystems does not seem to be the most effective. In the case of land, you shouldn’t just have the right to own, use and dispose. The ownership of land should simultaneously be accompanied by the acceptance of contracts in favour of third parties (servitudes), which society imposes on the nature user. The development of the form of common shared property is especially optimal at high costs for the specification of property rights for natural objects that, because of their systemic value, do not have the divisibility property. The introduction of this form of legal bundle distribution will provide saving dependent on the scale of the use of a resource located on a vast territory and fair distribution of risk arising from the use of the resource.

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