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Models of Auctions in Projects of Public Private Partnership


Ivan Makarov, Oleg Makarov
(about the authors)

Makarov Ivan Nikolaevich – Cand. of Econ. Sci., the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Lipetsk Branch

Makarov Oleg Anatolyevich – Cand. of Econ. Sci., Associate Professor of the Academic Department of Economics and Finance, the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow

Published in:
Russian Journal of Entrepreneurship
– № 4 / February, 2013



Keywords: auction models, concession, concessioner, franchise, patronized goods, public-private partnership


Citation:
Ivan Makarov, Oleg Makarov (2013). Models of Auctions in Projects of Public Private Partnership. Russian Journal of Entrepreneurship, 14(4), 17-24. — url: http://bgscience.ru/com/lib/4124


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Abstract:

The article is devoted to consideration of various models of organization of auctions taking into consideration a specific nature of assets in projects of production of patronized goods, implemented on the basis of a public private partnership.







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