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Expediency of privatizing tax administration


Sergey Belev
(about the author)

Belev Sergey Gennadyevich – Research fellow, Postgraduate student, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University

Published in:
Russian Journal of Entrepreneurship
– № 22 / November, 2013



Keywords: budget, outsourcing, private enforcement, privatization, public law enforcement, tax administration, tax base


Citation:
Sergey Belev (2013). Expediency of privatizing tax administration. Russian Journal of Entrepreneurship, 14(22), 191-204. — url: http://bgscience.ru/com/lib/4045


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Abstract:

Since the late 1980s the item concerning the expediency of tax administration privatization has been one of the items on the agenda of tax administration bodies. Some developing countries have restored the system of tax-farming during the 1990s; since 2006 the US Service of Internal Revenue (the analogue of Russian Tax Inspection Office) started delegating function of tax debt collection to private outsourcers. The author summarized the existing notions of private tax administration, analyzed the main advantages and disadvantages of private and public tax administration. Herein possible explanation of return to tax-farming is also provided on the basis of White hypothesis.







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